The battle of

Tsu-Shima

by

NJM Campbell

Few naval battles, apart from Jutland, have been more often described than the battle of Tsushima, the culminating action of the Russo-Japanese war at sea. Yet no account appreciates the real puzzle of the battle: how the Japanese managed to annihilate the Russian fleet with only 446 12inch shells from their most powerfül guns.

The war began on the night of 8/9 February 1904 with a surprise destroyer attack on the Russian ships anchored in the Port Arthur roads. This was a partial success only, but the two best Russian batdeships the Retvisan and Tsessarevitch were put out of action until late May/early June, having to be repaired with the use of cofferdams as there was no dock at Port Arthur that would take them. The night attack was followed up by a rather desultory daylight gunnery action which achieved little. At the outset the main Russian fleet (Vice-Adnüral Stark) based on Port Arthur comprised 7 battleships, 1 armoured and 6 light cruisers, of which 4 were large, and 25 destroyers, while 3 armoured and 1 large fight cruiser with 10 sea-going and 7 other torpedo boats were at Vladivostock. Including ships that would shortly be available, the Japanese under Vice- Adnüral Togo had 6 battleships, 8 armoured and 13 light cruisers, several old ships of which 4 could form part of the main fleet, 19 destroyers and 62 sea-going torpedo boats.

Up to 15 Nfay the Japanese were successful in all the operations off Port Arthur, the most effective being mine- laying. The battleship Petropavlovsk blew up on a mine and Makarov, the one notable Russian Adn-dral who had arrived at Port Arthur on 8 March, was lost with her. The battleship Pobieda was damaged by a mine, and other Russian losses from various causes were two light cruisers and three destroyers. But on 15 May two Japanese battleships, the Hatsuse and Yashima, were lost on Russian mines laid the previous afternoon in a dense fog, and the fast light cruiser Yoshino was sunk in collision. From now on the Japanese heavy ships were used as little as possible near Port Arthur, which had been cut off by the Japanese army on land.

On 23 June, when all the damaged battleships had been repaired, the Russian fleet under Rear Admiral Vitgeft left Port Arthur. But on sighting the Japanese that evening, turned back and with torpedo attacks that night achieved nothing. The battleship Sevastopol struck a mine and was out of action for six weeks. On 7 August Japanese 4.7inch guns which had been landed began to shell Port Arthur and three days later Vitgeft took his 6 battleships to sea with 4 light cruisers and 8 destroyers under orders from the Tsar to break through to Vladivostock. The battle that ensued is generally known as 'The Yellow Sea'. Altogether 4 battleships, 4 armoured cruisers, 7 light cruisers, 3 old ships, 1 torpedo-gunboat, 17 destroyers and 30 torpedo boats took part on the Japanese side. For a time the Russians fully held their own, but after more than 5 hours a 12inch shell burst on the Tsessarevitch's foremast, killing Vitgeft, and a few minutes later another hit the sighting süt on her CT and jammed the helm hard over, so that the Russian line was thrown into confusion. In the next hour and a half the Japanese inflicted much non-fatal damage, but once again the night torpedo attacks failed, though the battleship Poltava was hit by a torpedo that did not explode. This ship, with the battleships Retvisan, Pobieda, Peresviet, Sevastopol, the cruiser Pallada and three destroyers returned to Port Arthur, while the Tsessarevitch and the rest made for various neutral ports where they were intemed, except for one destroyer that was driven ashore, and the fast light cruiser Novik that made for Vladivostok but was disposed of by two Japanese cruisers in the Soya Straits.

Meanwhile, the three Vladivostok annoured cruisers had come south to meet Vitgeft if he succeeded in breaking out and on 14 August they were engaged off Usan by four armoured and two light cruisers under Vice-Admiral Kamirnura. The oldest of the Russians the Rutik, was sunk and the other two got away, though they took no more part in the war.

The Port Arthur fleet did not sortie again, though the Sevastopol came out on 23 August and was damaged by a mine. By 1 October the Japanese had ernplaced six 1 linch howitzers of French pattern and a further 12 were added during the month. It was not, however, until 5 December, when an observation post was established on 203 Metre Hill that the ships could be disposed of. The Poltava, Retvisan, Peresviet, Pobieda, Pallada, and the armoured cruiser Baryan that had missed the Yellow Sea battle through mine damage, were sunk in succession by the evening of 8 December, while the Sevastopol anchored out of sight beyond the harbour entrance. She was protected by a boom and nets and although 123 torpedoes were fired at her, only one hit, though a number exploded in the nets and caused some damage. The Sevastopol was towed into deep water and scuttled at the surrender of Port Arthur on 2 January 1905. The only important Japanese ship lost in this period of the war was the fast light cruiser Takasago mined during 12/13 December.

The major part of the Russian battle Fleet left Libau on 15 October 1904 for the Far East. This was already too late, but two of the most powerful ships had only just been completed. Various reinforcements were subsequently sent, the last on 15 February after Port Arthur had fallen, when the expedition should have been called off.

The whole force fmally assembled at Van Phong Bay on the coast of French Indo-China on 9 May 1905. lt is outside the scope of this feature to relate the story of the voyage of the various Russian squadrons, but it must be said that, without the use of neutral French harbours, particularly in Madagascar where the main part of the Baltic fleet stayed for eleven weeks, and also without the collier service chartered from the Hamburg Amerika Company, the Russian force would never have reached the war area. In point of fact the long stay at Madagascar was due to difficulties over the supply of coal and the need to re-negotiate the charter.

The force which left Indo-China comprised 8 battlesliips, 3 coastdefence ships, 3 old armoured cruisers, 5 fight cruisers, 5 auxiliary cruisers (ex-liners), 1 armed yacht, 9 destroyers and a fleet train of 1 repair ship, 2 armed transports, 9 Russian merchant ships, 2 tugs and 2 hospital ships. Among the auxiliary ships which had been intended to accompany the fleet but were prevented by machinery troubles when still in the Baltic, it is of interest to note an ex-Ener converted to a balloon ship and the large ice-breaker Ermak. The fleet was under the command of ViceAdmiral Rozhestvenski, who seems to have been of no outstanding ability. His main idea was to get to Vladivostok, if possible without a fight, and his battle orders envisaged the use of his cruisers to protect the fleet train, his destroyers acting as tenders to the battleships. Ort the way north 8 of the merchant ships were sent back and 4 of the armed liners were detached to make demonstrations which were quite ineffectual, but the remainder of the fleet train closely accompanied the warships to the end. The Russian battle-line consisted of 12 ships as follows:1st Division: Kniaz Suvarov (Vice-Adnüral Rozhestvenski); Imperator Alexander III,- Borodino, Orel; 2nd Division: Osliabia (Rear Admiral Felkerzam); Sissoi Veliki,- Navarin; Admiral Nakhimov; 3rd Division: Imperator Nikolai I (Rear Admiral Nebogatov); General-Admiral Graf Apraxin; Admiral Seniavin, Admiral Ushakov. THE RUSSIAN SRWS The first four ships had been laid down at the St. Petersburg yards in 1899-1901 but not completed until late 1903-1904 and they were not then entirely ready for service. They were high-sided with considerable 'tumblehome' and a nominal displacement of 13 516 tons which was well exceeded. There were four 12inch twin electrically trained French-type turrets fore and aft, and twelve 6inch twin turrets of similar type, three on either beam.

Twelve of the twenty 3inch were in a main deck battery and the rest in bow and stern casemates. The heavy armour was KC made in Russia or America, with some from Britain. There was a complete belt 11 ft wide and 7-1-6 in anüdships reduced to 5-,1-4 in at the ends. The main deck battery was protected by 3 inch armour, and the 12 in turrets had 10 in with 21 in roofs and 9-7 2 in bases reduced to 4 in behind the belt. The secondary turrets and bases had 6 in armour with 1.41-4 in roofs and the CT 8 in with a 5 in tube. The main deck was 2 in with a 1 in lower deck (1-4L in slopes) and the upper deck over the 3 in battery 2-1-12' in. There was a 11 in torpedo 4 bulkhead at a maximum of 6ft 8in inboard. Twenty Belleville boilers in two boiler rooms and two sets of engines gave 160M üip for about 17-2L knots.

The Ostiabia, sister to the Peresviet of the Port Arthur fleet, was a thoroughly bad design, built at St Petersburg in 1895-1901. She was also high-sided with a nominal displacement of 12 674 tons and a beam of only 71-2L ft. The main armament was only four 10inch twin French-type turrets fore and aft, with eleven 6inch of which one was unprotected in the bows, six in upper deck and four in main deck casemates. Of the twenty 3inch guns, eight were in an unprotected main deck battery. The heavy armour was mainly American Harvey with some KC. Of the 42e ft waterline, 312 ft was protected by a belt 7 ft 10 in wide and 9 in amidships (5 in lower edge) but reduced to 7 in fore and aft where there were 4 in bulkheads. Above the belt was 188 ft of 5 in armour to the main deck ending in 4 in bulkheads reaching to the forecastle deck. All the 4 in bulkheads had unarmoured doors. The turrets were 9 in with 5 in bases, the casemates 5 in and the CT 6 in. There was a 2-j in lower armoured deck extending to bow and stern with 3 in slopes, but none of the other decks were over 1 in. Thirty two Belleville boilers in four rooms with three sets of engines gave a designed 14 500 ihp = 18 knots. The Sissol Vellki built in 1892-1896 had a normal displacement of 10 400 tons. There were four 12inch fore-and-aft twin French type turrets, and six 6inch in a main deck battery. The armour was Nickel steel, not Harveyised, with an incomplete belt 16-12 in (4 in lower edge) ending in 9 in bulkheads. The deck was 1-41 in over the belt and 3 in below water outside the bulkheads. The armour above the belt was 5 in to the main deck with the same on the battery. The turrets and bases had 12 in armour. Speed was 15.7 knots originally.

The Navarin built in 1889-1896 was a low freeboard turret ship of 10 200 tons normal displacement resembling a smaller Nile and Trafalgar. There were four 12inch fore-and-aft twin turrets, with allround loading but without individual armour to the turret bases, and eight 6inch on the upper deck. The belt of compound armour was 16-14 in (8 in lower edge) ending in 12 in bulkheads. Above this was a shorter 12 in upper belt, while the deck was 3 in beyond the belt, 2-L in over the belt outside the upper belt, and 2 in over the latter. The battery had 5 in and the turrets 12 in Nickel steel, not Harveyised. The original speed was about 152' knots.

The Nikolai built in 1885-1891 resembled the British Sans Pareil in general layout but had a short higher forecastle. Of 9672 tons displacement, she carried two 12inch in a turret forward, while on the main deck were four 9inch with some protection and eight 6inch with none. There was a complete waterline belt, 14 in max. with 10 in on the turret, the armour being compound. Speed was at most 15 knots originally.

The Nakhimov was an old armoured cruiser, launched in 1885 and reconstructed. Of 8500 tons, her armament comprised eight 8inch in fore and aft and beam twin barbettes with ten 6inch. There was a short waterline compound belt of 10-6 in and 8-7 in on the barbettes with a 3 in deck at the belt upper edge amidships and below the waterline at the ends. The original speed had been 17 knots but was only 14 knots in 1904. The Apraxin, Seniavin and Ushakov were small coast defence ships launched in 1893-96. Their nominal displacement was 4126 tons and the armament four 10inch, (three only in Apraxin) in fore-and-aft turrets, with in addition four 4.7inch QF. The 10inch guns were a lower velocity model than those in the Osliabia. The thicker armour was Harvey with a partial belt on the waterfine of 10 in max. and 8 in on the turrets, with 2-3 in on the armour deck. Trial speeds were about 16 knots.

The first seven battleships were the only vessels really fit for the battle-Une, and of these the Navarin had older pattern 12inch guns of low mu27,le-velocity. Of the four ships of the Borodino class, three had only completed shortly before the first part of the Fleet left Russia, and their trials had been hurried; troubles with the steering occurred on the voyage. A large proportion of the Russian crews was inadequately trained, while the second-in-command, Felkerzam, was in poor health and died four days before the battle with the Japanese was fought. His flagcaptain was ordered to lead his division, while Nebogatov, whose ships had been the last to reach Indo-China, never discussed the battle plans with Rozhestvenski.

The cruisers comprised the Oleg (Rear Admiral Enkvist), a new 23knot ship with twelve 6inch guns; the Aurora, 20 knots and eight 6inch guns, sister to the Pallada of the Port Arthur fleet; the Svietlana, 20 knots and six 6inch guns and the Jemtehug and Izumrud, six 4.7inch guns and of 23-24 knots speed. In addition there were two reconstructed armoured cruisers older than the Nakhimov, the 1,7adimir Monomakh and Dmitti Donskoi, both with 6inch and 4.7inch guns and a speed of perhaps 15 knots. The armed yacht ,41maz and the armed liner Ural, could make 19 and 20 knots speed but were only lightly gunned. The train limited the fleet speed to 9 knots, but the warships could not have maintained a much higher speed as the Nikolai, which was heavily loaded and very foul, had a maximum speed of only 12 knots, and the three ships of the Ushakov class were hardly any faster.

Rozhestvenski decided on the most direct route to Vladivostok through the Straits of Korea, and after passing to the north of Luzon and to the east of Formosa, entered the East China Sea. He intended to pass through the eastern half of the Straits of Korea, between the Island of Tsushima and Japan at midday on 27 May, and coaled for the last time on 23 May at sea. It is usually said that the amount of coal taken on was regulated to give the Russian ships their normal load by noon of 26 May, when a battle was expected, but the three small ships of the Ushakov type appear to have had a good deal more than their designed quantity. Further reference is made to this point when discussing the fate of the Borodino class.

The Russian ships already at Vladivostok took no part in the forthconüng operations. The Japanese had laid extensive minefields off Vladivostok and the large armoured cruiser Gromoboi had been seriously damaged by a nüne on 23 May. The light cruiser Bogatyr, sister to the Oleg, had been very badly injured by running ashore in the earlier part of the war and her repair was beyond the resources of Vladivostok. This left only the large armoured cruiser Rossiya and some torpedo boats, and they remained inert.

THE JAPANESE SHIPS

The Japanese fleet, the ships of which had been given essential refits since the fall of Port Arthur, was concentrated in the Straits of Korea. The heavy ships were based at Masanpo in southern Korea, while some of the light cruisers and torpedo-craft were at Osaki Bay and Takeshiki in Tsushima. A watch on the Straits of Korea was maintained by light cruisers reinforced by armed merchant ships and old warships.

The Japanese battle-line, like the Russian, consisted of twelve ships. These were organised in two divisions which were to act together or independently as circumstances indicated. The first comprised the four battleships with two armoured cruisers, and the second six armoured cruisers. The order was as follows:

1st Division: Mikasa (Admiral Togo); Shikishima; Fuji; Asahi; Kasuga; Nisshin (Vice-Adnüral Nlisu).

2nd Division: Izumo (Vice-Admiral Kamirnura); Azuma; Tokiwa; Yakumo; Asama; Iwate (Rear Admiral Shimamura).

The Mikasa had been built by Vickers in 1898-1902 and had an actual normal displacernent of 14 358 tons. She had four 12inch guns in fore-and-aft twin turrets, the mountings by Elswick generally resembling the British BVl in HMS Formidable. There were fourteen 6inch, ten in a main deck battery and four in upper deck casemates, and twenty Inch. The heavy armour was largely KC with a nearly complete belt 7 ft 8 in wide ending in a stem 6 in bulkhead. lt was 9 in for 158 ft amidshiPs, dünning to 7 in by the barbette bases, at the outside of which were shallow 12 in bulkheads, and beyond these the belt reduced to 5~ in and 4 in. The upper belt and battery armour extended for 158 ft and was 6 in with angled 6 in bulkheads to the inner sides of the barbettes. The battery had 2 in screens and 1 in longitudinal bulkheads, and the four casemates were 6 in with 2 in rear walls. The turrets were 10-8 in with 3 in roofs and the barbettes and CT 14 in, the former reduced to 10 in behind the 6 in bulkheads. The armour deck was 2 in anüdships with 3 in slopes and 2 in at the ends, but by the barbettes in the space between the lines of the 12 in and 6 in bulkheads, it was curved and 4-y' in dück (11 in nickel steel on 3 in mild 2 Steel). There was also a 1 in upper deck over the battery. The 25 Belleville boilers and two sets of engines gave 16430 ihp = 18.5 knots on trials.

The Shikishima and Asahi built by Thames Ironworks and Clydebank in 1897-1900 differed in details from each other, and in appearance, being respectively three and two fürmelled. Actual normal displacements were 14431 and 14525 tons. The armament was as in the Mikasa, except that the 12 in mountings resembled the British BIV in HMS Glory, and that the 6inch guns were in eight main deck and six upper deck casemates. The heavy armour was Harvey-nickel, and the 9 in belt extended for 220 ft (224 ft in Asahi) and was 8 ft 2 in wide (8 ft in Asahi). Shallowangled 12 in bulkheads ran to the barbettes, and beyond these the belt was reduced to 7 in, 5~ in, 4 in, extending to stern and stern. The upper belt reached to the main deck and was 6 in with 6 in bulkheads. The turrets were 10-8 in and the barbettes 14 in reduced to 10 in behind the 6 in armour. The casemates were 6 in with 2 in rear walls and the CT 14 in. The armour deck was 2-11 in with 4 in slopes amidships, and the main deck was 1 in here. With machinery generally similar to that of the Mikasa, trials gave Shikishima 15 355 ihp = 18.6 knots, Asahi 15 593 ihp = 18.3 knots.

The Fuji, built by Thames Ironworks in 1894-1897, was of an older type of 12450 tlons normal displacement. Four 12inch guns were in twin fore-and-aft shielded barbettes with end-on main and allround auxiliary loading, the mountings resembüng the British BII in HMS P~Ince George. There were ten 6inch guns, four in main deck casemates and six in shields on the upper deck. The heavy armour was Harvey with a 226 ft x 8 ft belt, 18 in amidships (8 in lower edge) reduced to 14 in by the barbettes and ending in 14-12 in bulkheads. Above this was 4 in armour to the main deck with 6 in bulkheads, while the casemates were 6 in (2 in rear walls). The pearshaped barbettes were 14 in, reduced to 9-4 in behind the 4 in side, with 6-4 in shields to the 12inch guns. The CT was 14 in and the armour deck 22L in at the main belt upper edge amidships and below the waterfine at the ends. Ten cylindrical boilers and two sets of engines gave a forced draught 14 100 ihp = 18.5 knots on trials, but this was much reduced by the time of Tsushima.

Of the armoured cruisers, the Kasuga and Nisshin had been built by Ansaldo in 1902-1904 and bought by Japan from Argentina. They were of the Garibaldt type, displacing about 7700 tons normal. They differed in armament, the Kasuga having one 10inch forward and a twin 8inch turret aft while the Nisshin had twin 8inch fore-and-aft. Both had fourteen 6inch, ten in a main deck battery and four in upper deck shields, as well as ten Inch. The armour was Terni Harvey-nickel with a complete belt about 10 ft wide. This was 6 in amidships with 43, in bulkheads, and continued to the ends at 4-yl in, 3-2L in and 3 in. Above this was 170 ft of 6 in armour to the upper deck, ending in 4-,1 in bulkheads. The main armainent had 6-4 in, the CT 6 in, and the armour deck was 1 in with 1-y' in slopes. The upper deck was 1-2L in over the 170 ft of citadel arMour, and beyond this there was -41 in at the belt upper edge. They had cylindrical boilers, speed was a bare twenty knots and the Nisshin in particular had a very large turning circle.

The other six armoured cruisers generally resembled each other. The Azuma was built at St. Nazaire, the Yakumo by Vulcan, Stettin, and the other four by Elswick, the dates being 1898 to 1901, except for the Asama and Tokiwa in 1896-1899. Normal displacement was 9300-9750 tons, and all had four 8inch, in fore-and-aft twin turrets. The Elswick ships had fourteen 6inch in six main deck and four upper casemates, and four upper deck shields, while the other two had twelve 6inch, two main deck casemates being absent; all had twelve Inch. The armour was Harvey or Harvey-nickel in the Elswick ships and KC in the other two. The detailed distribution varied, but in general A had a belt about 7 ft wide, 7 in amidships and 4-3 in at the ends, rising to the main deck at the bow. The upper belt amidships was 5 in, with 6 in on turrets, and casemates and 14-12 in on the CT. The arrnour deck was 2 in or 2-2L in. The Asama and Tokiwa had cylindrical boilers and the others Belleville. Speeds were 20-21 knots, the Azuma being the slowest, and the Tokiwa with a trials speed of 22.73 knots originally, the fastest.

The Japanese had twelve light cruisers as well as the three Matsushimals (one 12.6 in, eleven or twelve 4.7 in, 16 knots) and the old battleship Chin Yen (four short 12 in, four 6 in, originally 14-i knots), and three torpedo gunboats which served as despatch vessels. They also had 21 destroyers and, including local flotiUas, 44 torpedo boats, armed respectively with 18 in and 14 in torpedoes having explosive charges of up to 220 and 132 lb.

One of the destroyer divisions was also equipped with mines, and it appears that other torpedo craft would have been used for mining, forming a special detachment under the Asama, but this plan was cancelled due to the bad weather. Apart from the Kasagi and Chitose (4900 and 4760 tons respective normal displacements, two 8inch, ten 4.7inch, 22-2L knots), the light cruisers were of 2450 to 3700 tons, with 6inch and 4.7inch guns and original trial speeds of 18 to 21 knots.

The battle which was fought between these fleets on 27 and 28 May, 1905 is usually known as the Battle of Tsushima, though Togo in his official report, called it the Battle of the Japan Sea. It resulted in the annihüation of the Russian fleet at very small cost to the Japanese. Their war-experienced officers and men were greatly superior to the Russians and Admiral Togo was much the better commander. The Japanese ships in the line of battle were generally better than the Russians and they could maintain a speed of 15 knots, with a possible 17-18 knots for the 2nd Division, as against a Russian figure of 11-12 knots. On the other hand there were only four Japanese battlesliips as against seven Russian (excluding the Nikolai), and the Japanese had only sixteen 12inch and one 10inch compared with twenty 12inch, six older 12inch and fifteen 10inch guns. Their superiority in 6inch guns was not likely, to be important but they had thirty 8inch as against two 9inch and six 8inch of older models on the broadside. With the earlier battles of the war in mind, there was little reason to expect such a complete victory, the relative ease of which was not anticipated by the Japanese.

Note: The Japanese had a considerable reserve of 12inch, as they had purchased 20 spare guns.

Rozhestvenski kept his fleet closed up during the night of 26/27 May, and Corbett who is critical of the details of the Japanese watch in his unpubfished account of the battle, considers that with a little luck, lie would have passed through their cruiser patrols undetected. The hospital ship Orel was out of station and this led to her discovery by the auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru. This latter ship then located other units of the Russian fleet and made the sighting signal by wireless at 04.50. Other Japanese cruisers gathered to watch the Russians but there was much mist and irregular visibifity, and information that the Russian battlesliips changed from their night formation to single line ahead was never passed to Togo, who had put to sea at 07. 10. There was a strong WSW wind (Force 5 to 7) in the Straits, and a rough sea until late in the evening, so that most of the Japanese torpedo-boats were sent to take shelter until later in the day. The 9th TB Division which had modern 147ft Normand type boats, recorded that they shot about like rockets, rolled through an angle of over 60' and at 15 knots or over seemed almost submarines. Haze and mist lirrüted visibility to a distance of 10 000 - 12 000 yds, and objects were often indistinct at half that distance. Meanwhile at 09.30 Rozhestvenski signalled his 12 ships of the battle-line into line ahead with the Oleg, Aurora and Donskoi astern. The fleet train was in a second line to starboard of the Oleg, with the Svietlana, Almaz and Ural astern and the Monomakh on the starboard flank. The Jemtchug and Izumrud, each with two destroyers were to starboard of the Suvarov and Osliabia respectively, and the remaining five destroyers were with the Oleg and Svietlana. At 11.42 the Ushakov, or according to some accounts the Orel, opened fire on the Japanese 3rd Division (light cruisers) at about 9000 yds, and the other ships of Nebogatov's Division also opened fire. About 30 rounds were fired before Rozhestvenski, whose battle orders had fixed 6000 yds as the maximum range, stopped the firing. The Japanese 3rd Division consisted of the Kasagi (Vice-Admiral Dewa), Chitose, and the smaller cruisers Otowa and Nütaka. They had missed contact with the Russians earlier, going too far to the south, and were to port of the Russians and on an East-North-East course when fire was opened. Only the Kasagi and Chitose repfied and the Japanese drew off into the mist. Rozhestvenski, for reasons which are not clear, decided to form his Ist Division into line abreast, or perhaps his intention was to form all 12 ships into a single line abreast. The Ist Division turned in succession 8 points to starboard but, instead of then turning together 8 points to port to form line abreast, they turned again in succession thus forming a second line ahead, to starboard of the other eight ships. It is not certain whether the manoeuvre was misunderstood by the Alexander, astern of the Suvarov or if it was annulled by Rozhestvenski, as his ships had become visible to the Japanese on entering a less misty area. At any rate the line of four Russian ships turned somewhat to port and increased speed to take station again ahead of the other eight and at 14.08 when the battle began in earnest, all but the Orel which was to starboard of the Osliabia had got back into the van.

At 13.39 Togo, who was then about 10 miles NW of Okinoshima, sighted the Russian fleet, faintly discernible to the SW in the mist which now allowed visibility to 14 000 - 16 000 yds. The Russian course was NE by N and Togo followed by Kamirnura, steered NW by N and then W. At 13.57 the Russians bore S by W 10 000 - 14 000 yds off. The Japanese note that the greyish-yellow funnels of the Russian ships were very easy to see and a good aiming mark, and the Russian painting, which incorporated blackish hulls and funnel tops with these funnels, was certainly at a disadvantage as compared with the Japanese uniform grey colour. At 14.02 Togo altered course to SW by S and it appeared that he intended to pass the Russian fleet on a reverse course, but at 14.05 he turned his Division in succession to port on to an ENE course to press the Russian van. At this time the leading Russians were steaming nearly NE by N and bore S by E at about 8500 - 9000 yds range, and at 14.08 when only the Mikasa had settled on her new course and the Shikishima was about to do so, the Suvarov opened from her fore turret at 7400 yds, the shot falling 20 yds astern of the Mikasa, and other leading Russian ships immediately followed, concentrating on the two leading Japanese.

In thus turning his ships at a fixed point within range of the Russian van, Togo ran some risk but it was less than it might seem at first sight. The bearings were such that initially the Russian after turrets could not train, the last five ships of their line were out of range, and the Orel was on the beam of the Osliabia which had to slow to allow her to get ahead. The two Japanese ships were thus under the fire of ten 12inch and two 10inch guns only, and it was improbable that at over 7000 yds they would all find the range at once. Kamimura's Division following Togo, would have run more risk but he turned a little to starboard before making his turn to port which was thus made at a greater distance from the Russians and by that time the fire of the leading Japanese ships was beginning to take effect.

The Mikasa opened fire on the Suvarov at 14.10 at 7000 yds and as they steadied on the new course, the other ships of Togo's and Kan-dmura's divisions followed so that by 14.20 all were firing. The Iwate and possibly the Kasuga and Nisshin had in fact opened fire before turning. Initially the Mikasa, Asahi and Azuma fired at the guvarov, and the rest at the Osliabia, easy to identify by her three funnels, but targets were altered and of the battleships, the Fuji changed to the Suvarov soon after 14.20. The Russians mostly fired at the Mikasa and also at some of the armoured cruisers. The rough seas washed into windward main deck gun-ports and gave a good deal of motion to the ships making it difficult to lay the guns. However the Japanese quickly found the range and maintained a highly accurate but usually slow fire. The Russian shooting too, was good in the early stages of the action. The courses of the two fleets were roughly parallel and to the north of east but the Japanese were doing 15 knots as compared to the Russian 10 and the latter were gradually forced to starboard. The range was mostly 5500 - 6500 yds and not below 4700 - 5000 yds. Rozhestvenski apparently considered an attempt to get to closer range, but it does not seem that it was ever made. By 14.35 Togo was steering due E and by 14.43 ESE and four minutes later a little further to the south, threatening to cross the 'T' of the Russian line.

By this time the Russians were in grave trouble. At about 14.18 the Osliabia had been hit by a heavy shell on or below the waterline forward which made a large hole and caused very serious flooding. Another shell pierced the armour amidships and entered a coal bunker, and here again serious flooding occurred. The ship took a heavy list to port and was down by the head, and counter-flooding and hole-stopping attempts were unsuccessful. In addition the fore turret had been hit and put out of action and she was badly on fire so that the Shikishima at 14.40 could not lay her guns on the Osliabia for smoke. At 14.50 the Osliabia turned to starboard out of line and at almost the same time was hit again on the waterline by two heavy shells, one of which made a second huge hole close to the first bad hit.

The Suvarov was frequently hit early in the action and by 14.20 was on fire. This apparently started from the fore chart-house and became very violent. By 14.35 Rozhestvenski and her captain had been wounded by spfinters entering the conning-tower and at 14.40 the Suvarov was temporarily hidden from the Japanese in smoke. Rozhestvenski was again wounded and flames drove into the conningtower, making it untenable, and the ship had to be directed from lower fighting stations. A 4-point turn to starboard had been ordered but the helm jammed so that the turn could not be stopped and at about 14.52 the Suvarov turned out of the line and continued round to starboard until she could be steered by her engines. There had been a large explosion in the after 12inch turret which ceased firing, and the after funnel had fallen, but her condition was not as critical as the Osliabias.

These two ships were the main Japanese targets, but visibifity was frequently impaired by mist and smoke; at about 14.35 Togo's division reported that they could only see the battle-flags at the Russian trucks: and other ships were also engaged. According to the British observer in the Asahi, the Alexander was hit several times early in the action, and she was also soon on fire. After the Suvarov was hidden in smoke at 14.40, she became the target for several ships and seems to have been badly on fire. The Borodino had a bad hit at about 14.30 according to the British observer in Asahi. For a short time she subsequently left the line, perhaps due to a machinery or steering defect, and with the Orel and Osliabia masked each other's fire. The Borodino seems to have regained her station at 14.50 or a little after. The Orel was certainly hit a number of times in this phase of the battle but her injuries were not vital. The Sissoi or perhaps the Navarin were set on fire but do not seem to have been badly hit up to 14.50, and the ships astern of them do not appear to have been engaged by the Japanese except that the Iwate fired at the Nikolai for a time.

The Mikasa had been hit by six 12inch and nineteen 6inch shells between 14. 10 and 14.50 but her fighting power was virtually unaffected. Of these hits, five 12inch and fourteen 6inch had been made between 14. 10 and 14.25. A few unimportant hits had been made on the other three battlesliips, while the Kasuga had one 12inch hit at 14.33, and at 14.40 the right fore 8inch gun in Nisshin was cut in two by a 12inch shell. All Kamirnura's armoured cruisers had been hit and the Azumas 8inch gun right aft had been put out of action by a 12inch shell at 14.50, but the only ship seriously affected was the Asama. At 14.28 a 12inch shell had struck her on the starboard quarter, and the shock of impact had put the steering gear temporarily out of action. At the time she was turning to port and she thus fell out of the line. Repairs were completed in six minutes but the other Japanese ships had vanished in the mist and the Asama put on full speed to rejoin them. For a time the Russian ships fired heavily at her but no serious hits were made until 15.00, shortly before she made contact with the Japanese again.

When the Suvarov turned to starboard and left the line, the Alexander at first followed her, but then led on an easterly course, until at 14.55 her captain turned suddenly to port and headed northwards followed by the other ships. This manoeuvre caused Togo to turn his division 8 points to port together at 14.57, and a further 8 points together at 15.05, thus coming into line ahead in reverse order, the Nisshin leading on a

WNW course, to block the Russian northward movement. Kamirnura however, seeing that the Russians were beconüng disordered and apparently about to turn to starboard, continued on the previous course at an increased speed of 17 knots, masking the fire of Togo's ships as lie passed across their sterns, and it was not until 15. 10 that lie turned 8 points to port in succession, followed by another 8 points to port at 15.16.

In this period the range was reduced, Kamimura's division closing to about 3300 yds which had increased by the time his turn was made. His main target was apparently the Alexander but the Sissoi and probably Navarin were fired at, as well as the Osliabia. The latterwas now sinking with an increasing list. The sea entered her main deck ports and then the bases of her funnels, and by 15.10 the Osliabia had gone down without capsi2ing, her deck nearly vertical. Russian destroyers rescued 385 survivors but 514 were lost.

Most of Togo's division ceased fire while making their turns, but a number of 12inch hits were made on the Japanese, of which the most important were one on the Fuji at 15.00 and two on the isolated Asama at the same time. The hit on the Fuji pierced the after barbette shield and burst inside, causing a cordite fire and putting the right gun out of action. The Asama was hit by two 12inch shells on the starboard side aft, 5 ft above water. These caused serious flooding and her draught was presently increased to 5 ft over the proper figure aft.

So far no torpedo attacks had been made though 17 Japanese destroyers were on the disengaged side of the battle divisions, and the four equipped with mines, had recently joined them. At 15.06 however, the torpedo-gunboat Chihaya attached to Kamimura's division, fired two Winch torpedoes at 2700 yds at a ship which seems to have been the Orel. Neither hit, as might be expected. At about this time the Jerntchug steamed towards the rear of Kamirnura's division and the head of Togo's, but was driven off by the Iwate, Nisshin and Kasuga at about 3300 yds before she could launch her torpedoes.

Togo did not yet know that the Osliabia had sunk, though ships of Kamirmira's division had seen her go down, the Iwate mistaking her for a Jerntchug class cruiser. He must however have known that victory was assured provided the Russian fleet did not escape northwards in the mist and fog. The next 22' hours of the battle were governed by Russian efforts to break through to the North and the Japanese countermoves. The visibility had deteriorated as much smoke combined with the mist and for the most part did not exceed 6000 or 7000 yds at best.

The Japanese were now steaming approximately WNW with Togo's division leading in reverse order. The Asama soon made contact again and at 15.15 took station ahead of the Nisshin. The Russian fleet had been in disorder since 15.00 or a little after, and the details of the movements of the various ships are not known. The Alexander broke off her northward advance and turned sharply to starboard, and the surviving three ships of the Russian 2nd Division fell astern so that Nebogatov's 3rd Division took their station next to the Orel. Togo opened fire on the Russians, who were now on the port side of the Japanese, at 15.07, Kamimura's division joining in at 15.20. The ranges varied from 5000 - 6000 yds down to 3000 or less to the main body of the Russian ships, while the Suvarov which was to the westward of the other Russian ships, was engaged at 15.20 for a time by the Shikishima, and apparently the Mikasa, at under 2500 yds. At 15.35 she suddenly appeared out of the fog on the port beam of Kamimura's ships and was engaged for five minutes by all five at down to 2000 yds or less. Apart from the Suvarov, the Japanese targets cannot be all identified and they were frequently obscured in mist and smoke. The leading Russian ship, believed to be still the Alexander (though according to some accounts she fell out temporarily and the Borodino led) was engaged by the Mikasa and other ships, and the Sissoi, at which the Fuji reported firing for a time, also appears to have been attacked. The Mikasa fired an 18inch torpedo at 15.21 at a ship which seems to have been the Suvarov and at about 15.35 the Yakumo and the Azuma each fired one 18inch at her. None of these three torpedoes hit.

By 15.30 the Russians were vanishing in the mist on the port quarter of Togo's division, and lie ordered the Nisshin to alter course 4 points to port. At 15.42 he turned simWtaneously 8 points to port, and then again at 15.49, thus bringing the Mikasa back to the lead on a North-Easterly course. At 15.47 Kamirnura turned his division in line ahead to starboard and took up a position on Togo's port bow. The Russian ships, apart from the Suvarov had meanwhile steamed SE from about 15.30 and then at 15.40 turned approximately NNE, so that another encounter was imminent.

It seems likely that the Alexander received much of the damage, which was eventually to prove fatal, in the action described above. At 15.25 the Izumo reported that her target, which was probably the Alexander had a considerable list to port, and by about 15.40 it appears that she was no longer leading the Russian line. The Sissoi and Orel were also probably damaged, while the Suvarov was in a bad way. Her fore 12inch turret was put out of action, Rozhestvenski was again seriously wounded and unconscious, and the British observer in the Azuma reported that she was down by the bow with a heavy Est to port, with no foremast or after funnel and only a ragged half of the fore funnel left. He adds that she was one mass of thick grey smoke from forecastle to mainmast, but still firing some after guns. At 15.39 the torpedo gunboat Chihaya closed the Suvarov to 1750 yds and fired two 14inch torpedoes, one of which was claimed as a hit, though the Suvarovs condition showed no visible change. At 15.45 the 5th Destroyer Division also attacked the Suvarov at 450 to 900 yds, and five 18inch torpedoes were fired. It seems probable that no hits were made. The Chihaya was hit by a shell just above the waterfine and had to make emergency repairs, and the destroyer division leader had a 3inch shell in one boder. These shells may have come from other Russian battleships, rather than the Suvarov.

Of the Japanese armoured ships the Mikasa was hit by a 12inch shell as were the Shikishima, Fuji and Nisshin. Hits were also made on most of Kamirmira's division but no very important damage was caused to any of the Japanese armoured ships in this phase of the battle.

THIRD STAGE

 At 15.55 Togo caught sight of the Russian main force again, now bearing East by South and 7500 - 8000 yds away, and at 16.01 the Mikasa opened fire at the third Russian ship, at a range of 7100 yds. The other ships of the 1st Division, as well as the 2nd Division ahead, opened within the next few minutes, and the Mikasa changed to the leading ship at 16.03. The Russians were now apparently in the order: Borodino, Orel,Alexander, Nikolai, Apraxin, Seniavin, Sissoi, Navarin, Nakhimov, Ushakov, the last named having a large shell hole forward. The Russian line was gradually forced southward and by 16.24 the Japanese were steering approximately east. In a few minutes the Russians headed southwards and disappeared in the mist.

The Suvarov meanwhile had steamed to the North-East and once more found herself between the two fleets. The Mikasa opened a heavy fire on her at 16.08, and other ships of Togo's division followed at a range which fell from 6100 to 2200 yds. Some of Kamimura's ships also fired at her and the Japanese Ist Division reported that tongues of flame were issuing from maindeck gun-ports, and that she resembled an island volcano in eruption. At about 16.30 the British observer in Asahi saw a 12inch shell burst between decks, close to the after 6inch turret. Flames spouted 50 ft from the side, the stump of her main-topmast fell and at the same instant there was a considerable explosion. Until then she was still occasionally firing from an after turret, but now only one or two of the stern Inch guns still fired. She showed no signs of sinking however, and the British observer in the Azuma thought that she was less down by the bow at 16.20 than 41 hour previously. The Mikasa had fired an 18inch torpedo at 16.18 and another at 16.24, while the Shikishima fired one at 16.32 but none hit.

Apart from the Suvarov it is impossible to identify the Japanese targets, and ranges appear to have been always over 4000 yds to the main body of the Russian ships. lt cannot be stated with any certainty how much damage was done to them in this period of the action, but the Alexander was undoubtedly the ship in worst state, other than the Suvarov.

The Mikasa was hit by a 12inch shell at 16.15, and the Nisshin by a heavy shell at 16.05 which sent spünters into the conrüng-tower and wounded Vice-Admiral Misu. Some of the 2nd Division were also hit, and the unlucky Asama, which had sighted her own Division at about 15.50 and steamed ahead on the disengaged side of the Ist Division to regain her proper station. She was so slowed by her previous damage aft and by a 6inch shell through the base of the after funnel, which reduced the boiler furnace-draught, that she did not take station astern of the Iwate until 17.05. Apart from the Russian hits, the right fore 12inch gun failed in Shikishima at 16.15, and the turret roof was damaged and the left gun also put out of action for a time.

At 16.35 Togo turned his division 8 points to port simultaneously, to forestall any attempt to escape North round the Japanese rear, but no such movements developed and at 1,6.43 he turned 8 points together to starboard back into line ahead. The Russians had now completely vanished in smoke and haze and at 16.51 Togo altered course to due South. Meanwhile Kamimura in the van, had altered course to approximately SE at 16.35 and to nearly due S at 16.42, but fearing to lose touch with Togo, he turned back onto a North-Westerly course at 16.47. At this time he heard firing far to the South, and soon, seeing that Togo's division had turned onto a Southward course, lie again turned in that direction and took station on the port bow of the 1st division.

 At 16.43 Togo had ordered the 4th Destroyer Division to attack and they made for the Suvarov at 18 knots. This division which was to accomplish more in the battle than any other destroyer division, was the one fitted for minelaying and each destroyer carried eight mines with 100 lb charges in addition to her usual armament of two 18inch torpedo-tubes and four torpedoes. The division comprised the Asagiri . and Murasame, built in Japan, and the Asashio and Shirakumo, built by Thornycroft. All four were 375ton boats with designed speeds of 29-31 knots, but a ricochet had hit the Murasame at 14. 10 and reduced her speed to 20 knots. The Suvarov was blazing with flames shoofing out of the upper deck and sides but was still steaming roughly WNW at about 10 knots and was sufficiently under control to turn her head quickly to starboard when the destroyers were seen on the port side.

At 17.05 the Asagiri and Murasame each fired one torpedo at 650 yds and the Asashio immediately followed with two, but the rough seas striking the sides of the torpedoes as they entered the water, made them inaccurate. The Asagiri and Murasame again attacked on an opposite course at 350 yds and though the Asagiris torpedo misfired, that launched by the Murasame hit the Suvarov on the port quarter. She suddenly fisted about 10' but showed no signs of sinking, and although only one shell hit the Asagiri without causing much damage, the fire of the Suvarov's one or two remaining 3inch guns was reinforced by that of other Russian ships. As a result the Shirakumo did not fire any torpedoes, nor did the 3rd Destroyer Division, which had been intended to make a subsequent attack; this division was fired at by Russian ships at 3300 yds.

Under Togo's plan, his 12 light cruisers, with the three Matsushima class and the Chin-Yen which comprised Vice-Admiral Kataoka's 5th Division, were to attack the Russian cruisers and fleet train to the rear of their battlesliips. This action had been going on since about 14.45, though Kataoka's ships did not engage for two hours, and its details are not relevant to the major fight between the armoured ships. It must be noted however that from about 14. 10 to 14.20 some of the Japanese light cruisers had fired at the leading Russian battleships at 6000 - 9000 yds, and that at about 16.45 some of the Russian battlesliips driven South in the main action, engaged the Japanese light cruisers for 15 or 20 minutes at about 4500 - 9000 yds without doing very much damage. The Takachiho which had been repairing previous damage and was separated from the other fight cruisers had a brush with Russian battlesliips at 17.20 when the range was 9400 yds, and Kataoka's 5th Division may also have had a short engagement with them at about 17.10.

Since 16.51 Togo had been steaming South and at 17.00 two Borodino class battlesliips were sighted to the South-West on a northerly course. The Russian ships opened fire at 7200 yds to which the Mikasa immediately repfied and the other ships of the 1st Division followed. The Fuji reported a range of 5200 yds at 17.07 but this then increased, and the Russians disappeared in the mist soon afterwards. Togo did not turn North after them at this stage, but continued to the South firing at various targets dimly seen through the mist. The armed liner Ural disabled and abandoned in the cruiser-fighting previously was the most visible of these. The Japanese were now facing the evening sun, and conditions were probably better from the Russian line as the Nisshin was hit by a 12inch shell at 17.20 which cut the left after 8inch gun in two. Why Togo did not immediately turn after the Borodino class ships is not clear, but by 17.28 lie concluded that the main body of the Russians were to the North of him, and turned his division on to a NNW course. In point of fact the Russian battlesliips, led by the Borodino and Orel, had turned on to a North-Westerly course, and Togo had been steaming in roughly the opposite direction.

Meanwhile Kamirnura's division ahead, had fired at various targets in the mist and fog, and hearing firing on the starboard bow, had altered course in that direction. His ships intervened in fighting between the Japanese and Russian cruisers, and soon after 17.30 went in chase of some of the latter to the SouthWest, thus parting company with Togo's division for the time being.

Since the attack of the 4th Destroyer Division, the Suvarov seems to have steamed Southward at 4-5 knots and the Russian destroyer Buiny crowded with survivors from the Oshabia at abou 17.30 or a little later, took off Rozhestvenski, who was only intermittently conscious, and also some of his staff. Nebogatov was apparently never formally notified that the command had passed to him, though he received Rozhestvenski's orders to make for Vladivostok on a course N 230 E. The destroyer Biedovy is said to have been sent to take off the rest of the Suvarovs crew but this was never done.

THE LAST TWO HOURS

Though much damage had been inflicted on the Russian battlesliips at small cost to his own, Togo cannot have felt very satisfied with the position at 17.30, but the last two hours of the daylight battle were to end in the assurance of a great victory. During this period of the battle the Ist and 2nd Japanese Divisions were not in company until the end and Kamirnura's ships contributdd little to the action with the main Russian force.

After Togo's turn at 17.28, his division maintained a generally NNW course until 17.52. They fired at the derelict Ural and at the repair ship Kamehatka, which was also disabled, and both the Mikasa and Shikishima fired a torpedo at the Ural, the latter of which hit at 2400 yds, and in a few minutes the Ural went down. At 17.52 Togo altered course to WNW, but sighting some Russian destroyers which appeared to be intending an attack, lie temporarily turned to the NE at 17.56 until they were driven off by the Mikasas fire. At 17.57 two Borodino class battlesliips were seen in the WNW, steaming Northwards and 6900 yds away, and at 18.00 Togo turned onto a NNW course again and opened fire.

The Russian fleet had now reformed with the cruisers and destroyers, as well as the surviving fleet train, on the disengaged side. The armoured ships were in order as follows: Borodino, Orel, Nikolai, Apraxin, Seniavin, Alexander, Sissoi, Navarin, Ushakov, Nakhimov. The Alexander was to starboard of the Seniavin and there were gaps between the Orel and Nikolai and between the Seniavin and Sissoi*. At first the Japanese concentrated on the Borodino and the range fell slowly to 6000 yds at 18.25. The setting sun was shining on the sea, and the fall of shot could not be seen so that the Japanese firing became slower. Soon conditions for the Japanese apparently improved and at 18.33 the Mikasa noted a good many hits on the Borodino. She was hidden in smoke and some ships changed target to the Orel which was shooting accurately, the spray from her near-misses often drpnching the bridges of the Japanese ships. The Russians had begun to edge off to the westward, and the range had -risen to 7200 yds at 18.42 causing the Japanese to turn onto a NW course at 18.45. The Russians however turned further to port and the range gradually increased so that the Japanese 6inch guns ceased firing, the main armament continuing a slow and accurate fire.

Although the Borodino was the principal target, the Mikasa reporting her on fire at 18.40 and Captain Pakenham, the British observer in the Asahi seeing a very conspicuous hit at 18.57 when the range was 8400 yds, the first ship to fall out was the Alexander. The Japanese state that the Ist Division fired only at the Borodino and Orel in this action, except that the Kasuga occasionally fired at other ships, and though it is possible that targets were mistaken and that the Alexander was fired at for a short time when the Russian line first turned away westward, it seems likely that her falling out was as a result of continued flooding from injuries received in the earlier part of the battle. Russian witnesses in other ships say that her bows were nearly destroyed and there was a huge hole in the port side forward. A very large fire was also raging on the boat deck, and the Alexander began to fall astern, flying the distress signal, and with a heavy list to port. She temporarily recovered and returned to the line astern of the Seniavin, but shortly before 19.00 again tumed out of the line to port, and at 19.00 or a few minutes after, suddenly capsized and sank with all hands. The Borodinos end was not to be long delayed. At 19.04 the Mikasa reported that her mainmast had fallen and that there was a large fire, and at 19.18 when the range was 9000 yds two 12inch shells fired by the Shikishima hit. Pakenham relates that flame burst from her after battery and leaping to a height of at least 30ft, at once gained possession of the whole breadth of the ship and seemed to be working forward rapidly. Her after turret was now silent. It was already twilight and after a few more shots, the Mikasa turned due north at 19.23 and ceased fire. As the Fuji reached the turning point her last 12inch shot produced the sensation of the day. In Pakenham's words:

Entering the upper part of the Borodino near the foremost broadside turret, it burst, and an immense column of smoke, ruddied on its underside by the glare from the explosion and from the fire abaft, spurted to the height of her funnel tops. From every opening in engine-rooms and stokeholds steam rushed and in two or three minutes, the ship from foremast to stem was wrapped in flercely whirfing spirals of smoke and vapour, gaily illumined by frequent tall shafts of flaine. it was evident that the conflagration had reached a stage where it could defy control, and that the vessel's fighting days were numbered, though even so it was not reahsed how near was the end. Though sudden, this was not dramatic. While all watched, the unfortunate ship disappeared, her departure only marked by a roar not greatly louder than that of one of her own bursting shells, and, until dispersed by the wind, by a great increase in volunte of the dense cloud that brooded over the place she had occupied. It is doubtful whether any in the Japanese fleet saw her go, as little but the outEne of her stem had been visible for some minutes.

It seems certain that the final hit caused a magazine explosion which sank the Borodino. There is some difference in the various reports as to the exact time when she sank, but it was probably at 19.30. Only orte man was saved from her crew of 855**. The remaining Russian ships made off to the south-west, while at 19.28 Togo ordered the Japanese fleet to go north and fixed Utsuryo To on the north side of the Island of Matsushima for the rendezvous next morning. The wind had now somewhat fallen, but there was still a good deal of swell and in the fading twilight the Japanese torpedo craft could be seen coming up from North, South and East through heavy seas. In this last action of the daylight battle, further hits were also made on the Orel, but she was not vitally injured. In the Japanese ships, the right fore 12inch gun in Mikasa failed at 18.04 from a premature, and as in Shikishima previously, the turret roof was damaged and the left gun put out of action until 18.40. The Mikasa was also hit by a 12inch shell at 18.45 and by a 6inch at 18.26 which disabled one 6inch gun permanently. A 12inch shell hit the left fore 8inch gun in the Nisshin at about 19.00 and cut the gun in two, but otherwise there was no important damage to Togo's division in the phase of the battle.

The movements of Kamimura's division and the end of the Suvarov remain to be described. Shortly after 17.30 Kamirnura had chased some Russian cruisers to the southwest but they altered course to the north-westward and Kamirnura was actually following them on an outside curve, which was latterly somewhat divergent, and lie could not catch them. At 18.03 lie abandoned the chase and tumed towards the estimated position of Togo's division. The details of his course alterations need not be related, and after passing the disabled Suvarov and Kamchatka, at which some of his ships fired, Kamirnura at about 18.30 sighted the rear of the Russian line at about 12 000 yards range on the port bow, and according to the report of his division, temporarily on a southward course. The Tokiwa reported sighting one Borodino class (Alexander), with the Sissoi, Navarin and Nakhimov, and it seems that these three latter ships temporarily tumed southward and then on to a north-westerly course at a greater distance from Togo's division than the rest of the Russian battlesliips. The southward turn was apparently made shortly after the Alexander first fell out of the line.

The Tokiwa was the first to open fire and by 18.50 other armoured cruisers had followed with a slow fire at about 8000-9000 yards. Conditions of visibility were not good and except at 19.15 when the three leading armoured cruisers fired at a Jemtchug class cruiser, targets are not identified in the reports. By 19.30 firing ceased and at 20.08 Kamimura rejoined Togo's division. It is doubtful if the Russians were much damaged in this action by the Japanese 2nd Division, and the Izumo was hit by a 12inch shell at 19. 10 which might have caused considerable injuries if it had burst.

The Suvarov was now near the disabled repair ship Kamchatka. She was a complete wreck, still blazing, with flames out of most scuttles and ports, but still steaming slowly, though not under control, and able to fire two or three small stern guns. As noted above, Kan-dmura's ships had fired a few rounds at her and from about 18.30 most of the Japanese light cruisers were firing at her and the Kamchatka at ranges down to 1300 gards. The Kawgi had, however, been compelled to make for shelter by a hit below the waterline, received earlier in the battle, and the Chitose had accompanied her, so that none of the light cruisers had heavier guns than 6inch. At 18.48 Kataoka's 5th Division, without the Matwhima, which had had a steering-gear breakdown, engaged the Suvarov and Kamchatka at 3800-4900 yards, aided by one light cruiser division, the others having steamed North. Kataoka's ships had heavy guns, and Corbett says that 12.6inch shells kept bursting on the Suvarov, but this is not supported by the Japanese ammunition returns, which gave the heavy projectile expenditure for the entire battle as:Itsukushima two 12.6inch; ChinYen five 12inch; Hashidate nil; and Matsushima (temporarily absent), three 12.6inch. The failure to make more use of the heavy guns in this division may have been due to the difficulty of working the olderpattern barbette mountings in rough seas.

The Kamchatka sank at 19.00 or soon afterwards, but the Suvarov was still under way as before. Kataoka had at this time a number of torpedo-boats in company, and the 1 lth Division of four 128 ft Schichau type boats attacked at 19.20. They ran in at 20 knots to 300- 350 yards without being fired at, and launched seven Winch torpedoes of which two or three hit. One torpedo was thought by the attackers to have exploded a magazine as black and yellow fumes poured out. The Suvarov heeled over to port and then capsized. For a short time she floated bottom up and at 19.30 or just before, her bows lifted high in the air and she slid rapidly out of sight. Except for the few taken off with Rozhestvenski, there were no survivors and 928 were lost with her.

Thus by 19.30 Togo had achieved a great victory; the Suvarev, Alexander, Borodino and Osliabia sunk. The Sissoi and Navarin were seriously damaged near the waterline, and the Orel much battered. The other five Russian ships in the line did not count for much in any case, but all except the Seniavin were damaged to some extent. In the Japanese armoured ships three 12inch and four 8inch guns were out of action, but only the Asama had been seriously damaged.

During the night, the Japanese torpedo craft were to attack the surviving Russian ships. At dusk the swell was high enough to cause torpedo-boats to rofi through 50' or 60', but this dropped during the night. Salt spray which had covered the boats during the day had impaired the eyesight of the crews.

The attacks were made as follows:

1st and 2nd Destroyer Divisions (totafling 9 boats) and the 9th Torpedo- boat Division (4 boats) originally to the northward, between 20.10 and 21.20.

3rd and 5th destroyer Divisions (8 boats), originally to the East, between 20.30 and 21.15 with one isolated attack at 22.30.

1st, 10th, 15th, 17th, 18th Torpedo- boat Divisions (20 boats), originaffy to the South, between 21.10 and 22.10.

Of the other Japanese torpedocraft, the 4th Destroyer Division (4 boats) did not attack until later and the 14th, 19th and 20th Torpedoboat Divisions (11 boats) never located the Russian ships. The one serviceable boat of the 16th Division located a target after 01.00 on the 28th but was driven off before she could fire torpedoes. The 11 th Division (4 boats), which had attacked the Suvarov at 19.20, returned to base for more torpedoes, and the 5th Torpedoboat Division (four older boats) based on the Japanese coast, never found any Russian ships.

The Japanese attacks were somewhat confused from so many torpedo craft working independently, and there was no detailed plan of attack. 2 destroyers and 4 torpedo-boats of the attacking divisions never found a target, and in addition 3 destroyers and 3 torpedo-boats were involved in collisions, in which one torpedoboat (No 69) was sunk. As one destroyer had made an attack before collision, the total number which actually fired torpedoes in these attacks was 13 destroyers and 17 torpedo-boats. These launched respectively, 23 - 18inch and 31 14inch torpedoes at ranges of about 200 to 650 or exceptionally 900 yards, and made three hits. A number of the Japanese torpedo craft were hit by Russian projectiles from rifle bullets upwards, and some were damaged but only two torpedo boats were sunk, after they had made attacks. (Nos 34 and 35).

The Russians had been steaming in a south-westerly direction at nightfall but at about 20.30 Nebogatov, who now commanded the Russian fleet, altered course to N 23E as previously ordered by the seriously wounded Rozhestvenski. The ships in company with the Nikolai were the Orel, Apraxin, Seniavin and the cruiser Izumrud. According to Nebogativ their speed was a little over 11 knots, and lie had forbidden the use of any searchlights. He states that the Nikolai was attacked once unsuccessfuUy, but otherwise these ships appear to have escaped the Japanese. Some of the vessels astern used their searchlights and in so doing gave their positions away to the attacking torpedo craft. The Nakhimov was torpedoed in the earlier part of the attack, it is said by a destroyer which was mistaken for a Russian. She was hit on the starboard bow and though later attacks were avoided, she had to stop engines to make ternporary repairs. Finally the Nakhimov made stern first for the nearest land, and reached the east coast of Tsushima at 07.00 on the 28th.

The old cruiser Wadimir Monomakh is also said to have mistaken her attacker for a Russian destroyer. She was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side forward and also made for the coast of Tsushima. The Navarin had been seriously damaged near the waterline aft during the daylight battle and, according to a survivor, by 21.00 on the 27th her stern had settled so much that water on the upper deck reached the after 12inch turret. She was forced to stop and was then hit by a torpedo from a boat which had crept right under her stern. She was not completely disabled, however, and seems to have got under way again.

Enkvist with the Oleg, Aurora and Jemtchug stated that several unsuccessful attacks were made on these three auisers, but as all were Munnelled and only two destroyers report firing torpedoes at Münnel ships, this statement is open to doubt. There is unfortunately insufficient evidence to decide what Japanese torpedo craft attacked any particular Russian ship or to assign the three hits made with any certainty. So far the torpedo attacks had met with very limited success, but the 4th Destroyer Division, employing both their mines and torpedoes, were later to achieve a remarkable result. The Murasame had to return to base at 23.30 as she was taking water aboard from the ricochet hit noted previously, but the other three saw a Russian ship at about 02.00 next moming, about 600 yards away on their starboard bow. Their recognition signals were unanswered and each dropped her mines, 24 in all, about 300 yards ahead of the Russian ship. In a minute or two a dull thud and loud explosion were heard. This ship was the Navarin, whose few survivors thought that she had been torpedoed again. An explosion seemed to heave up the whole stern and then there was another to starboard ainidships, and she capsized and sank. Only three were saved from her crew of 674.

The 4th Destroyer Division sped on and at about 14.40 came up with the Sissoi, at which each of the three fired a torpedo in passing. One hit right aft, wrecking the rudder, but the Sissoi was able to steer by her engines. She had however been seriously damaged forward near the waterline during the daylight battle, and steamed for the coast of Tsushima.

Meanwhile Togo and Kamirnura proceeded North, untroubled by any attacks from the Russian destroyers. The Asama's flooding aft increased during ther night, and she had to stop for 50 minutes at 06.30 but was then able to continue. On the morning of 28 May, the ships with Nebogatov were located to the South of the main Japanese force. They comprised the Nikolai, Orel, ApmWn and Seniavin with the cruiser Izumrud. The Japanese steamed to attack them and opened fire at 10.34 at about 8000 yards. After a few shots, their firing became general but the Russian ships did not reply. One or two hits were made on the Nikolai and it was then seen that the Russians had surrendered and firing ceased by 10.50. The fast Izumrud had previously made off and got away. The rights and wrongs of this surrender cannot be discussed here but the position of Nebogatov's squadron was quite hopeless. Of the four ships only the Orel was of any real value to the Japanese.

Of the Russian ships off Tsushima, the Nakhimov was taken by a Japanese destroyer and an auxiliary cruiser but her crew had opened the sea-valves and she sank at 09.00. The Sivoi surrendered to three auxiliary cruisers and the Japanese attempted to take her in tow, but here again valves had been opened, and she went down at 11.00. The old cruiser Vladimir Monomakh also surrendered, and kept afloat until 14.30 when she sank.

The Ushakov alone remained of the 12 ships originally in the Russian line of battle. She had fallen far astern during the night from damage received in the daylight actions, but had not used her searchlights and had avoided torpedo attack. She was sighted to the South on the afternoon of the 28th and the Iwate and Yakumo overtook her at 17.00 and called on her to surrender. This was ignored and at 17.30 the action began at 9800 yards. In a little over 20 minutes the Ushakov's guns were silenced and she had apparently stopped her engines. At 18.07 there was an explosion, thought by the Japanese to be from scuttling charges, and in three minutes she went down. Neither Japanese ship was hit in this action in which they fired 89 - 8inch and 278 - 6inch shells.

Of the Russian light cruisers, Enkvist broke away to the South during the night of the 27th and the Oleg, Aurora and Jemtchug were eventually intemed at Manila. The Izumrud got away when Nebogatov surrendered, but was wrecked on the coast North of Vladivostok, and the Svietlana was sunk on the 28th by the Japanese light cruisers Otowa and Niitaka. The fate of the old Wadimir Monomakh has already been noted, and the Dmitri Donskoi, after engaging Japanese light cruisers on the evening of the 28th, was attacked early that night off Matsushima by four Japanese destroyers which fired eight 18inch torpedoes at 350-550 yards, apparently without success; she was abandoned and scuttled soon after daybreak on the 29th.

The armed liner Ural, repair ship Kamchatka and ocean tug Russ were sunk on the 27th and the hospital ships Orel and Kostroma captured. The armed transport Irtish badly damaged on the 27th, was run ashore on the Japanese coast, and the transport Korea and ocean tug Svir escaped to Shanghai where they were interned. The armed transport Anadyr was missing for 45 days and then turned up in Madagascar from whence she returned to Russia.

Of the nine Russian destroyers the Buistry, Bezuprechny and Gromky were sunk or driven ashore by the Japanese. The Buiny was scuttled and the Biedovy to which Rozhestvenski had been transferred, surrendered. The Blestiashchy was abandoned in a sinking condition and scuttled and the Bodry, short of fuel, drifted about the Yellow Sea untü found by a British steamer on 4 June and towed to Shanghai where she was interned. Only the Grosny and Bravy with the armed yacht Almaz reached Vladivostok.

The Russian casualties were 4830 killed or drowned, 5917 taken prisoner, of whom many were wounded, and 1862 interned; a total of 12 609. Another 1227 escaped to Vladivostok or Madagascar. The Japanese had 117 killed and 583 wounded, and only three torpedo-boats were sunk. Victory could scarcely have been more complete.

*According to some the Ushakov was astern of the Seniavin which does not seem likely. The Navarin may have been ahead of the Sissoi.

**Though some accounts say there were four survivors from a total of 840.